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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court's award of Rule n sanctions was in error because a finding 
oi res judicata does i lot ai ltoi i laticall) lead to sanctioi is. Second, the Court s order 
that judicial estoppel does not apply in this case should be upheld. Third, the 
District Court s uivln lihdiii/', llidt (• 1111 • i < i • \ ('oiiiplaiiil i , li.u i < -i I In nvs /iiJirf/fu r-, 
incorrect and this case should be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings. Finally, the District Court's judgment should not be upheld based on a 
Aiolitiioit oi Ruir - (, Utah IV l/./p P. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Sanctions should not have been awarded because Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. was 
not violated. 
Rule n requires that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry into the validity of 
theactioi i pric i Itc filh igaCoi nplaii it w 1 licl IG illi i lor's attorne> did. (R i i o ];: • 24 11 3-9 
and R. 229, p. 3211.12-19). 
[Bjy presentii ig a pleading ai 1 at toi ne> is certify ii lg that 
to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and 
belief, lormed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, (b)(i) it is not being presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase 111 me cost of 
litigation; (b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal 
1 
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. 
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). 
Rule 11(b)(2) was not violated because these claims have not been brought in any 
other suit and the claims are warranted by existing law. (R. 229, p. 3511. 9-16). 
Moreover Gillmor's claims are not "frivolous". "Frivolous filings are 'those that are 
both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.'" Estate of Blue v. 
County of Los Angeles, 120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Contrary to 
Appellees' position, before bringing this case, Gillmor's attorney did the research that 
Rule 11(b)(2) requires: 
[S]ome of this is not in the record because this is a notice 
pleading state, and I'm not going to tell you what the record 
will show if we get... past this motion. Because I knew this 
motion was coming up. There's no question, when I filed the 
complaint, they sent a Rule 11 threat letter. They graciously 
backed, off the Rule 11 threat letter, but they made the 
motion nonetheless. And I understood it, anticipated it. I 
anticipated the arguments that were going to be made 
because they laid them out really clearly before, and I 
anticipated the arguments that were going to be made 
because they laid them out really clearly before, and I 
anticipated in advance. When I first raised this, there'd been 
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a number of correspondence over the course of a couple of 
years before we got to this lawsuit, and we've had a full and 
frank discussion of these issues in the past to the point 
where they suggested I read the trial transcript in the last 
trial read every word of it, read everything that you could 
read about it so we understood what the case was about, (R. 
no , p. 231.18 - p. 241. 24) (emphasis added). 
Gillmor's counsel did research the law and the prior actions between these parties prior 
to bringing the Complaint, as required by Rule 11(b)(2). 
Appellees cite Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) for the position that "Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate when a plaintiff seeks to 
avoid the affect of a final decision on the merits of her claims by filing a new 
proceeding." (Appellees Brief, p. 37). Schoney is completely distinguishable. Gillmor 
and her counsel did not merely "file a new Complaint containing the original claims". 
Shoney at 60, n. 1. Instead Gillmor's attorney researched the law, over the course of 
years, and determined that Gillmor did have a basis to file this Complaint with claims 
that had not been brought before. (R. 229, p. 221. 23 - p. 231. 22). 
Also, contrary to Appellees' position, Gillmor's counsel did explain what steps 
he took to research this matter to the District Court, and after conducting research 
Gillmor's counsel determined there was reasonable basis to bring the action as in 
Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1992). The Appellees claim that 
Barnard is inapplicable to this case "because in this case Gillmor's counsel failed to 
offer any explanation to the trial court of what steps he had taken to inquire into the 
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validity of this action" (Appellees Bried, p. 39-40) is inaccurate as shown above, and 
Gillmor's counsel also discussed some of the other research he had done prior to 
bringing this claim with the District Court: 
The legal theories in this case were 180 degrees apart from 
the legal theories in the last case, completely and totally 
separate. The last case, the only one that Ms. Gillmor could 
possibly have binding against her because it's the only one 
she was the plaintiff in, in that case, she was arguing only on 
a contract. There was no argument about road-by-use ... I 
have a historian who spent thirty thousand bucks just to 
show this road's use since 1848. There is no question about 
good faith on the highway-by-use claim. ... And that's a 
completely new theory. (R. 229, p. 2311. 8 - 20). 
As we're driving over the road, Your Honor, I happened to 
notice, right next to the road sweetheart trees. And 'C.S. + 
M. K. = True Love, 1958.'... And the statute says if it is used 
as a public road for a period of ten years, continuously as a 
public thoroughfare, then it becomes a public road and can 
only be closed by the local government. (R. 229, p. 2611.12-
23). 
[T]he fact is that the legislature chose to determine whether 
it's a public purpose or not, and they said it's a public 
purpose ... a by-road leading from a highway or residence 
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and farms, which must by definition of legislative 
construction, be something different than a city/county 
road. (R. 229, p. 6111. 2-13). 
"Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive research. The appropriate 
standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under all of the 
circumstances." Barnard at 1236. 
Even if a district court finds that a claim is not valid and subject to dismissal, 
Rule 11 sanctions do not mechanically follow: "[W]e cannot say that [counsel's] reading 
of the law, alone, supports the conclusion that he did not make a reasonable inquiry 
into the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions contained in the complaint." 
Hess v. Johnston, 163 P.3d 747,751 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). Gillmor's counsel 
researched the law relating to the claims in the Complaint and met the objective 
standard and requirements of Rule 11. 
Here, obviously, the District Court found that Gillmor's action was barred by res 
judicata. However, even ifres judicata barred a Complaint, Rule 11(b)(2) sanctions do 
not automatically follow. If sanctions were to automatically follow then the Rule or 
case law interpreting the Rule would include such directive. In support of Appellees' 
argument that Rule 11 sanctions are proper when there is a finding of res judicata the 
Appellees cite Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235,1240 (11th Cir. 1989): "Rule 11 
sanctions are appropriate where a party files a claim barred by res judicata" 
(Appellees Brief, p. 37). However, Thomas v. Evans is a case that supports Gillmor's 
position that Rule 11 sanctions do not inevitably follow when a court makes a 
determination of res judicata. 
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The primary rationale of the district court was that Rule 11 
sanctions were warranted because the claims brought in this 
case are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. A plaintiff 
may be sanctioned under Rule n for filing claims barred by 
res judicata. Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate if the filing 
was unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the 
time of filing. Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate, 
however, merely because the pleader's view of the law is 
incorrect. Rule 11 contemplates 'some prefiling inquiry into 
both the facts and the law/ but Is not intended to chill an 
attorney s enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or 
legal theories'. Thomas at 1240 (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
Additionally neither Gillmor or her counsel violated Rule 11(b)(1), because this 
Complaint was not frivolous and it was not intended to hinder, delay or defraud the 
Appellees. 
[This Complaint] wasn't filed to harass. Ms. Gillmor doesn't 
want to spend her money paying me to harass Mr. Richards. 
He may think so, but it isn't true. All she wants is access. 
That's not harassment. She's not trying to unnecessarily 
delay anything. * * * This is to vindicate two completely 
different legal theories that were not raised, not discussed, 
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not considered, the facts of which weren't presented in the 
last trial. (R. 229, p. 231. 25 - p. 241.19). 
Gillmor and her attorney believe this Complaint is not frivolous and it was not brought 
for any improper purpose so Rule 11(b)(1) was not violated in bringing the suit. (R. 
229, p. 32,11.12-19). Rule 11(b)(1) requires a finding of bad faith or improper purpose 
and the District Court specifically did not find such. 
Whether the standard is subjective bad faith, as identified 
above, or objective improper purpose, the record in this case 
does not provide a sufficient basis to attribute either such 
motive to plaintiff or Mr. Baird. In the present case, I see no 
evidence of a purpose to harass, delay or impose 
unnecessary cost.... Neither can I find sufficient evidence in 
the record to show the absence of an honest belief that the 
action might be justified, or that the action was filed to take 
unconscionable advantage of defendants. * * * Excessive 
zeal in a cause is not necessarily an improper purpose or 
evidence of bad faith. (R. 200 (emphasis added)). 
As the District Court noted it is unclear whether the standard to evaluate if Rule 11 is 
violated is "subjective bad faith, [ ] or objective improper purpose." 
[T]he 'bad faith' determination must be made 
independently of the 'without merit' determination by 
defining good faith for purposes of section 78-27-56, as 
maintaining: '(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the 
7 
activities in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of 
the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay or 
defraud others. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d 
556,560 (Utah 2005). 
In Still Standing the Court overturned the districts court's award of attorneys' fees for a 
violation of 78-27-56 because "[t]he trial court's finding that the action was frivolous is 
insufficient to establish bad faith. * * * Further, there is no evidence in the record that 
[plaintiff] intended to take unconscionable advantage of others." Id. "Plaintiffs were 
clearly pursuing a mertiless claim and better preparation might well have disclosed 
that to them. However, that conduct does not rise to lack of good faith." Cady v. 
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149,152 (Utah 1983). 
Likewise just because the District Court dismissed Gillmor's claims because of 
res judicata does not mean that Gillmor's claims were meritless. Unlike in Pennington 
v. Allstate Insurance Co., 973 P.2d 932,939 (Utah 1998), where the Court held that 
"pursuing an action to force an insurer to pay unreasonable and/or unnecessary 
medical charges to exceed the PIP cap is an improper purpose", no Utah Court has held 
that pursuing an action that is later found to be barred by res judicata is improper for 
the purpose of the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Because Rule 11 was not violated 
the District Court should not have awarded sanctions under Rue 11(b)(2), and this 
Court should not remand for a determination of Rule 11(b)(1) sanctions. 
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II . Judicial estoppel is inapplicable to this dispute. 
Gillmor lost the last dispute between these parties and Appellees did not 
"raise the claimed res judicata issue, claim preclusion issue in the 2001 lawsuit." (R. 
229, p. 2911. 21- 23) (Appellees Brief, p. 41). Because Gillmor did not prevail in the 
1985 or 2001 actions, judicial estoppel does not apply. 
The principal of judicial estoppel prevents a party from 
seeking judicial relief by uttering statements inconsistent 
with its sworn statement in a prior judicial proceeding. 
However, the rule followed in Utah requires that the party 
seeking judicial relief must have prevailed upon its 
statement in the earlier proceeding: 'A person may not, to 
the prejudice of another party deny any position taken in a 
prior judicial proceeding between the same persons or 
their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such 
prior position was successfully maintained/ Stevensen u. 
Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 352-353 (Utah 1996) (emphasis in 
original and added) (citations omitted). 
The District Court correctly applied Utah law when it determined that judicial 
estoppel does not apply because Gillmor lost the prior dispute between the parties. 
The mandate that the previous position must have been successfully maintained in 
order to invoke a claim of judicial estoppel has remained the same for at least 60 
years, when the Supreme Court of Utah decided Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Openshaw Inv. Co., 132 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1942). The purpose of judicial estoppel 
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is to "protect the integrity of the judicial process" ... and the doctrine "is an equitable 
[one] invoked by the court at its discretion." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 
742, 750 (2001) (emphasis added). Since the point of judicial estoppel is to protect 
the integrity of the judiciary, "[albsent success in a prior proceeding, a party's later 
inconsistent position introduces no 'risk of inconsistent court determinations.'" New 
Hampshire at 750-51 (citation omitted).1 
The Appellees attempt to claim that any access Gillmor has been granted, at 
all, is a favorable outcome for Gillmor and therefore she should be barred from 
seeking the public use claims that she brought in this Complaint. (Appellees Brief 
pp. 30-31). However this mischaracterizes the 1985 and 2001 actions. Gillmor's 
husband, Frank Gillmor, gave up access rights when he entered into the 1985 
Agreement. Before the 1985 Agreement he had access over two different roads and 
after the agreement he was limited to access only over one. Giving up something you 
had previously can hardly be called "prevailing". Moreover as the District Court said, 
"[i]t seems to me that, to the extent Frank, quote, "prevailed," it was by urging the 
prescriptive easement to get some easement by agreement." (R. 229, p. 3711.12-14). 
1 Of course, if counsel for Appellant had wanted to play the Rule 11 game this long-
standing rule on judicial estoppel would have given rise to a Rule 11 claims against 
Appellees' counsel for bringing a Rule 11 claim against Appellant's counsel. But 
sooner or later the circularity of Rule 11 attacks against quality counsel is not helpful 
to the process. 
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This is far different from what Appellees assert about Gillmor successfully 
maintaining a private v. public stance. 
Furthermore, the 2001 action stripped even more access from Gillmor, again, 
less access is under no sense of the word "prevailing" - it isn't even a "victory" that 
could be remotely characterized as even being pyrrhic. Because judicial estoppel 
only applies if Gillmor "prevailed" in previous actions and Gillmor did not prevail in 
1985 or 2001 the doctrine is not applicable and the District Court correctly rejected 
Appellees judicial estoppel argument. (R. 229, p. 6311.18-20). 
There are five elements that must be met to invoke iudicial estoppel: 
1) the prior and subsequent litigation include the same 
parties or their privies; 2) the prior and subsequent 
litigation involve the same subject matter; 3) the prior 
position was 'successfully maintained' and 4) the party 
seeking judicial estoppel has relied on the prior testimony 
'and has changed his position by reason of it'; Our cases 
have also mentioned another issue relating to judicial 
estoppel, which the court of appeals has explicitly required 
as a fifth element: bad faith. Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 
600, 602 plus FNi (Utah 2008). 
"Indeed, requiring a showing of bad faith by the party against whom judicial 
estoppel is sought is a widely-accepted view." 3D Const. & Dev., L.L.C. u. Old 
Standard Life Insurance, 117 P.3d 1082,1086 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). As noted in 
section I., above, relating to sanctions, the District Court specifically found no bad 
11 
faith (R. 200) on the part of Gillmor or her counsel and this is another reason that 
Appellees argument for judicial estoppel fails. This Court should uphold the 
determination of the District Court that judicial estoppel is not applicable to this 
dispute. 
III. Res judicata does not apply because there was a change in the law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes "the general Rule that res judicata is no 
defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has been 
an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation." State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154,162 (1945) (emphasis 
added). The Court of Appeals decision against Gillmor in the 2001 case created just 
such an altered situation for Gillmor when it lessened the access she had. Therefore, 
res judicata does not bar her from bringing this Complaint. As stated by Gillmor's 
counsel, "[Gillmor's] position in the 2001 case was for rights about this big 
(demonstrating) and, when the Court of Appeals finished with it, the rights were 
maybe a teeny, tiny sliver of what Ms. Gillmor was arguing for. At that point, it's a 
pretty clear argument that the facts have ... materially changed." (R. n o , p. 351. 23 -
P- 361. 4)-
Additionally, there has been a change in the "highway-by-use" law, which is 
one of the two claims Gillmor assets in her Complaint. (R. 229, p. 471.10 - p. 48 1. 
25) The change in "highway-by-use" law supports Gillmor's request for access to her 
property. As stated by Gillmor's counsel, "[I]f the Court reads ... the road-by-use 
trilogy that came down just a month or so ago from the Supreme Court, it's clear that 
any Tom, Dick or Harry on the street has a right to bring a road-by-use case." (R. 
12 
229, P- 30 U. 10-15). This change in law precludes a finding of res judicata on the 
"highway-by-use" claim in Gillmor's Complaint. (R. 1-7). 
Appellees claim that "highway-by-use" law has merely been clarified and not 
changed so res judicata is applicable. However, Collins v. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment, 16 P.3d 1251,1254 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) supports Gillmor's position 
that "highway-by-use" law has changed and therefore is not subject to res judicata. 
In Collins the Court held that the law had changed based on an interpretation of an 
ordinance. Gillmor argues the same here where the Supreme Court of Utah 
interpreted the "highway-by-use" statute and such interpretation is a change in the 
law that makes res judicata inapplicable. The Collins Court cites both Duel and 
Statler v. Catalano, 293 Ill.App.3d 483, 229 Ill.Dec. 274,691 N.E.2d 384 (1997) in its 
decision. A further discussion from the Statler Court is instructive on why res 
judicata is inapplicable to Gillmor's claims: 
The doctrine of res judicata is of judicial origin and has 
been characterized as a rule of convenience designed to 
prevent repetitious law suits over matters which have once 
been decided and which have remained substantially 
static, factually and legally, but which must give way 
where there has been a change in the fundamental 
controlling legal principles. Similarly, the rule prevails in 
Illinois that res judicata extends only to the facts and 
conditions as they were at the time a judgment was 
13 
rendered, and to the legal rights and relations of the 
parties as fixed by the facts so determined; and when new 
facts or conditions intervene before the second action, 
establishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the 
parties respectfully, the issues are no longer the same, and 
hence the former judgment cannot be pleaded as a bar in 
the subsequent action. Even though the basic facts have 
not changed, it is generally accepted that res judicata does 
not operate as an automatic bar where between the time of 
the first judgment and the second there has been an 
intervening decision or a change in the law creating an 
altered situation. Statler at 276-277 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
In Gillmor's case both the facts and the law have changed. Therefore res judicata 
should not have been applied because courts should be careful about the preclusive 
effects of prior decisions, Zufelt u. Haste, Inc., 142 P.3d 594, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 
2006), and this Court should remand the matter to the District Court decide the 
claims in Gillmor's Complaint. 
IV. Additionally, res judicata does not apply because these claims were not 
required to be brought in the prior actions. 
Res judicata also does not apply in this case because this Complaint involves 
claims that have never been brought before. In this case one cause that Gillmor 
brings is condemnation and, contrary to the Appellees position, condemnation could 
14 
not have been argued in the alternative in the 2001 (or the 1985) action: As noted by 
Gillmor's counsel, "[t]he need for condemning an access doesn't arise under the 
condemnation statues if you have access. That's a sine qua non of condemnation, 
that it is, quote, necessary, close quote." (R. 229, p. 2911. 21 - 24). This analysis was 
not contradicted by Appellees. Gillmor had no need to seek condemnation when she 
had access and once that access was eliminated she made a claim for condemnation 
for a road pursuant to §78B-6-50i(i)(e), U.C.A. Also, as discussed in section III., 
above, the law of "highway-by-use" has changed allowing Gillmor to make a claim 
for such in her Complaint. 
Appellees make much of the fact that because these claims are for access, the 
claims are related to those brought in previous suits and that is why res judicata 
applies. However, res judicata did not bar another suit in Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l 
Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992) even though both suits were based on contract. Nor 
did the Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983) or Searle Bros. v. Searle, 558 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1978) Courts find res judicata even though all actions were about 
access. Due to the change in the facts that allow the condemnation action to proceed 
and the change in the law that allow the "highway-by-use" claim to proceed Gillmor's 
Complaint is not barred by res judicata. 
The District Court dismissed this action based on res judicata2 (R. 109), and 
acknowledged that issue preclusion "is not the specific bar to [Gillmor's] present 
2 It is not clear whether the District Court found resjudiciata on the grounds of the 
1985 dispute or the 2001 dispute. 
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action" (R. 201) so the discussion by Gilmor about issue preclusion and claim 
preclusion being overlapped is warranted. Similarly, Gillmor's causes of action in 
this case, condemnation and "highway-by-use" (R. 1-7), have never been tried or 
asserted (R. 229, p. 2411.1519), and these claims are not barred by res judicata 
because of the change in facts and law. 
V. The Judgment should not be confirmed for failure to comply with R. 24, Utah R. 
App. P. 
Gillmor acknowledges and apologizes to the Appellees and the Court for her 
oversight in not specifically citing the record. However, Gillmor was not trying to 
misstate the record or mislead the Court or the Appellees. In fact, Gillmor attached the 
pertinent documents at issue in this case to both the Docketing Statement and her 
Opening Brief and discussed those documents. And now that Appellees have brought 
the oversight to her attention, Gillmor attaches the Opening Brief with all record 
citations as an Addendum to this Brief. 
Appellees cite Koulis v. Std. Oil Co., 746 P. 2d 1182 (Utah Ct App. 1987) and 
Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) for the position that Gillmor's 
arguments should summarily be dismissed because she failed to cite the record. 
However, neither Koulis or Philips are similar to this case where Gillmor did attach and 
discuss the pertinent documents and the Appellees are not at a disadvantage from her 
mistake. Moreover, this case is almost entirely a case of legal interpretation and not a 
case of what facts were or were not found in the record. The legal analysis of this Reply 
Brief and the Opening Brief are almost independent of any factual issues. 
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The brief in Phillips "wholly fail[ed] to comply with Rule 24." Phillips at 1109. 
Gillmor's Opening Brief does not wholly fail to comply with Rule 24. She did not cite to 
the record but she did comply with the other sections of Rule 24. The brief in Koulis 
was likewise different from Gillmor's brief: 
Koulis' brief can fairly be described as being filled with 
burdensome, emotional, immaterial and inaccurate 
arguments. Further, only a small proportion of authorities 
cited in this brief bear any resemblance to the proposition 
for which they are cited, and most are irrelevant or directly 
contradict the propositions, thus indicating that there is 
little, if any, legal support for her allegations. Koulis at 1185. 
As in Carrier u. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004), the Court should not 
assume the correctness of the District Court's decision based on Gillmor's accidental 
failure to make record citations. "Although we certainly disapprove of the County's 
incorrect record citations, we are nevertheless able to adequately navigate the record 
with the citations provided and do not find that these oversights are equivalent to the 
errors in ... Koulis" Carrier at 1214. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 11 was not violated and sanctions should not have been awarded. 
Additionally, Gillmor's action is not barred by res judicata. The Court of Appeals 
should reverse both Orders below, and return the case to the District Court for 
further proceedings on the substance of Gillmor's Complaint. 
DATED this I day of May, 2009. 
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Dallis A. Nordstrom 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-4-103(2)0*). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
a. Res judicata. 
i) The Court below held that Appellant's claims were barred by res judicata. 
ii) Standard of Review. "[A]ppellant argues only that the ... petition was barred 
by res judicata. Therefore, this appeal presents a question of law. Accepting the trial 
court's factual findings, we review its conclusions of law for correctness, according 
them no particular deference." In re: J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161,162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(internal citations omitted). 
b. Rule 11 Sanctions. 
i) The Court below granted Appellees' Motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 
11, Utah R. Civ. P. 
ii) Standard of Review. "When reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 determination, 
we review the trial court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, the 
trial court's conclusion that Rule 11 was violated under a correction of error 
standard, and the trial court's determination of the type and amount of sanction to 
be imposed under an abuse of discretion standard." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 
Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) citing Barnard v. Sutlijf, 846 P.2d 1229, 
1235 (Utah 1992). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case: This appeal is from two final Orders issued by the 
Honorable Judge Robert K. Hilder, in the Third Judicial District Court for Summit 
County, Utah, on motions to dismiss (R. 154-156) made by Defendants/Appellees 
("Appellees") and on a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. (R. 195-205.) This dispute is 
about access to a parcel of land that is essentially landlocked. (R. 2 and 197.) As a 
result of a prior interpretation of a settlement agreement between some persons 
related to the parties in this action, the parcel of property is accessible only to 
Plaintiff/Appellant ("Gillmor") and a few others and only for very limited purposes, 
animal husbandry and hunting. Gillmor u. Macey, 2005 UT App 351. The road to the 
property has been in use by the public as a thoroughfare for at least one hundred 
years for numerous purposes. (R. 110, p. 241. 23 - p. 251. 21.) 
b. Course of the proceedings: Gillmor filed a Complaint seeking private 
condemnation and/or "highway-by-use" over Appellees' lands. (R. 1-7.) Appellees 
filed Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing judicial estoppel and res 
judicata. (R. 22) Gillmor opposed the Motions to Dismiss, arguing that her 
Complaint contains new claims, parties not included in the previous actions and on 
other grounds. (R. 70-77.) Appellees also filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. (R. 
111-112.) 
c. Disposition at trial court: The District Court below granted the Motion to 
Dismiss only on the grounds of res judicata, (R. 109.) Following the Order Granting 
the Motion to Dismiss (R. 154-156), Appellees were also granted Rule 11(b)(2) 
sanctions. (R. 195-205.) 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
Gillmor owns property that is effectively landlocked as a result of topography 
and a prior court ruling. See, Gillmor u. Macey, 2005 UT App 351; see also R. 2 and 
197). The Appellees own lands that stand between Gillmor's property and the most 
convenient presently declared public road. (R. 3.) The Appellees have been unwilling 
to allow Gillmor to have reasonable access to her property. (R. 5.) This action was 
brought under two unconventional legal theories to gain Gillmor access to her 
property - "highway-by-use" (R. 5) (Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (2001)) and 
condemnation (R. 4 and R. 229, p. 291. 20 - p. 301. 7). This is the first time an 
action was brought that includes all the property owners that block Gillmor's 
property from access to a road and the first time that these claims have been raised. 
(R. 1-7.) 
Previously, in 1984, Gillmor's deceased husband, Frank Gillmor, brought an 
action against only the largest landowner between Gillmor's property and the main 
Weber Canyon Road, David K. Richards. (R. 31, Exhibit No. 2 and R. n o , p. 29 11. 20-
23.) In that action Mr. Gillmor sought access to the Gillmor property by either a 
prescriptive easement or an irrevocable license across Mr. Richards property. (Id.) 
That action ended over 20 years ago with a settlement agreement between Mr. 
Richards and Mr. Gillmor providing for some access to the Gillmor property across 
Mr. Richards' property. 
Another action was later brought in 2001 by Ms. Gillmor against Mr. Richards 
to determine and enforce the terms of the prior settlement agreement so that Gillmor 
and others could continue to access the Gillmor property. (R. 31, Exhibit No. 1.) That 
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action ended when the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the settlement agreement 
and left Gillmor's property essentially landlocked, all but for her and a limited few 
others for very limited purposes. The Court of Appeals specifically found that the 
easement created in the agreement did not run with the land and would not inure to 
a future landowner, or even to Gillmor's children (by a marriage prior to her 
marriage to Frank Gillmor). Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, H19 and 23. 
This action arises not from the 1984 settlement agreement but instead from 
Gillmor's statutory rights. (R. 1-7.) Importantly, since the Court of Appeals decision, 
"highway-by-use" law has changed in Utah. 
In this action, unlike the previous two actions, Gillmor does not seek an 
easement over anyone else's property or any legal redress based on the settlement 
agreement, instead she brings new claims. (R. 1-7 and R. 229, p. 3 11. 4-6.) Moreover, 
this action is brought against all the landowners who block her property from 
declared public roads, not just Mr. Richards and his successors-in-interest, in order 
to access her property. (R. 1-7). 
The Appellees' filed Motions to Dismiss under two theories. (R. 22). The 
District Court rejected the Appellees' judicial estoppel argument but granted the 
Motion on the grounds of res judicata. (R. 109.) Thereafter the Appellees' filed a 
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions that the District Court granted.3 (R. 195-205.) 
3 Gillmor concedes that Appellees followed proper procedure about advance warning that 
Appellees would seek Rule 11 sanctions. Appellees gave Gillmor advance warning that Rule 
11 sanctions would be sought under both the res judicata and judicial estoppel theories. The 
District Court found that the judicial estoppel argument lacked merit. Gillmor chose not to 
escalate this tit-for-tat battle by seeking Rule 11 sanctions against Appellees for their efforts 
on the judicial estoppel theory. (R. 229, p. 26 11. 4-13). 
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This case involves new parties and different claims than those previously 
decided. (R. 1-7.) Therefore it is not barred by res judicata and sanctions should not 
have been granted. See Complaint, Second Amended Complaint and Amended 
Complaint, attached to the Docketing Statement as Exhibits D, E and F. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Gillmor's Complaint was not barred by res judicata because these claims have 
never been brought and this is the first case to involve all of the landowners that 
block Gillmor's property access. (R. 1-7.) Additionally, Rule 11 sanctions were not 
appropriate in this case because there was no bad faith and Gillmor (and her 
counsel) had no intent to defraud or harass Appellees. (R. 158-163.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. No prior legal action was res judicata. 
Simply put, res judicata does not apply in this case: 
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve 
the same parties or their privies and also the same cause of 
action; and this precludes the relitigation of all issues that 
could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, 
litigated in the prior action 
Schaer u. State, 657 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Neither of the two requirements for res judicata is met because this suit 
involves different parties and this suit involves different causes of action. (R. 70-77). 
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Gillmor's case is surprisingly similar to the facts in Schaer, which also 
involved multiple lawsuits and property access. In Schaer the State of Utah 
condemned 4.6 acres of Schaer's 22.8 acre property to build a highway in 1967. 
Schaer asked for and received severance damages because the condemnation 
landlocked the remainder of his property. The Court specifically found that the 
action left the remainder property with no access. 
Over a decade later Schaer instituted another suit seeking an access road to 
the remainder of the property so he could develop it for residential use. The Utah 
Supreme Court found that res judicata did not bar his second case: 
because it is based on a different claim, demand or cause 
of action than that of the 1967 litigation. The two causes of 
action rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a 
different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two 
causes of action. Moreover, the evidence of the two causes 
of action relates to the status of the property in two 
completely different and separate time periods. 
Id. (emphasis added). Gillmor's case is similarly not barred by res judicata since 
either a declaration of condemnation (R. 229, p. 2911. 21-24) or "highway-by-use" 
(R. 229, p. 23 11. 13-18) to access the property require a different state of facts and 
evidence then interpreting a private settlement agreement between two parties. 
TWlhere the second cause of action between the same 
parties is upon a different cause or demand, the principle 
of res judicata is applied much more narrowly. In this 
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situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as an 
estoppel, not as to matters which might have been 
litigated and determined, but 'only as to those matters in 
issue or points controverted, upon the determination of 
which the finding or verdict was rendered.' Since the cause 
of action involved in the second proceeding is not 
swallowed by the judgment in the prior suit, the parties 
are free to litigate points which were not at issue in the 
first proceeding, even though such points might have been 
tendered and decided at that time. 
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). Gillmor is entitled to have a court determine whether she can 
access her property via condemnation or "highway-by-use" (R. 229, p. 3511. 4-5) due 
to the "completely different and separate time period" of the actions and because 
these points were "not at issue in the first proceeding". "[W]e resolve all doubts in 
favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy". 
BYUv. Tremco, 2006 UT 19, U28 (citation omitted). If there is any doubt whether 
res judicata exists here the doubt should be resolved in Gillmor's favor and this 
dispute should be remanded to the trial court so that she can have her day in court. 
Hill u. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992) also supports 
Gillmor's position. In Hill the parties were involved in a contract dispute. A first 
action was brought and concluded in federal court regarding the contract between 
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the parties and then a second action based on the same claims was brought in state 
court. 
Because we hold that the prior federal court proceeding 
never fully explored the contractual relationship between 
Hill-Magnum and Seattle First, collateral estoppel does 
not prevent Hill-Mangum from relitigating the issue. Id. 
at 242 (emphasis added). 
After the federal court's decision, Hill-Mangum brought 
the same claims against Seattle First in state court, 
alleging, inter alia, that Seattle First... breach[ed] an oral 
contract with Hill-Mangum. Id. at 244 (emphasis added). 
We agree that the federal court ruling bars any claim Hill-
Magnum might base on the written agreement. However, 
to the extent that the trial court relied on collateral 
estoppel to bar an enquiry into the rights created by an 
oral agreement, it erred. Id. 
Both of the claims in Hill were based in contract yet the Court allowed the second 
case to proceed based on an oral contract because the first case only resolved the 
written contract. Similarly Gillmor should not be precluded from seeking access to 
her property against all landowners that block her access with claims that have never 
been brought or reached by any court. (R. 70-77). 
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Although the District Court dismissed this action based on res judicata* (R. 
109), an analysis of why this case should also have not been dismissed on preclusion 
grounds is helpful because courts have often overlapped the doctrines of claim and 
issue preclusion when deciding a case on res judicata grounds (See, BYU u. Tremco, 
2005 UT19, K1f 24 - 38). There are four tests courts apply when determining if a 
case is barred by collateral estoppel, also known as preclusion: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated? 
Schaer at 1340-41. Neither tests one or three are satisfied in this case. 
The first test is not satisfied because the 1984 case only involved access to the 
property over Mr. Richards' property through a license or an easement. The 2001 
case only involved interpreting the agreement that settled the 1984 case. The current 
dispute involves access, not as an easement or a license, over all of the land, not only 
Mr. Richards', that blocks Gillmor's property. "We [must, therefore,] determine 
whether the issues actually litigated in the first action are precisely the same as those 
raised in the present action." Schaer at 1341 (emphasis in original) (citations 
4 It is not clear whether the District Court granted resjudiciata on the grounds of the 1984 
dispute or the 2001 dispute. 
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omitted). This litigation involves "highway-by-use" and condemnation and "the 
issue[s] raised in th[is action were] never litigated in the prior proceeding[s]" so 
Gillmor's Complaint is not barred by res judicata. Searle Brothers u. Searle, 588 
P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978). 
The 1967 litigation was a condemnation action which 
focused on whether the plaintiffs remaining property was 
effectively landlocked. Despite vague and indirect 
references to the dugwav road, the IQ67 litigation never 
focused on the precise issue of whether the dugwav road 
was a public thoroughfare under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89 
[the predecessor to the current Utah Code Ann. §72-5-
104]. 
* * * 
lT]here is nothing in its findings to preclude another court 
twelve years later from finding that access is not 
reasonable, economical and feasible by way of the dugwav 
road. In any event, neither the findings nor the judgment 
entered in the IQ67 case demonstrates that the court 
considered and Ruled on the precise issue in this case ... 
[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel 'does not apply to 
issues that merely could have been tried in the prior case, 
but operates only to issues that were actually asserted and 
tried in that case'. 
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Schaer at 1341 (emphasis in original and added) (internal citations omitted). 
Similarly, Gillmor's causes of action in this case, condemnation and "highway-by-
use" (R. 1-7), have never been tried or asserted (R. 229, p. 2411.15-19) and these 
claims are not barred by the prior actions. 
Likewise, the third test is not satisfied because this case involves all of the 
landowners limiting access to the property. Claim or issue preclusion is only 
applicable when the case involves all of the same parties or the parties are all in 
privity. Murdock et al v. Springville Municipal Corp., 1999 UT 39,113. The 
previous actions only involved Mr. Richards or his successors-in-interest, so 
preclusion does not bar this action. 
II , Res judicata is additionally inapplicable in this case because there was 
a change in the law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes "the general Rule that res judicata is no 
defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has been 
an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation." State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. u. Duel, 324 U.S. 154,162 (1945) (emphasis 
added). The Court of Appeals decision created just such an altered situation for 
Gillmor when it lessened the access she believed that she had prior to the decision so 
res judicata should not have barred her from bringing this Complaint. 
Additionally there has been a change in the "highway-by-use" law, which 
allows Gillmor to bring her Complaint. (R. 229, p. 471.10 - p. 48 1. 25) The change 
in "highway-by-use" law supports Gillmor's request for access to her property: 
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The lack of clarity in this area of the law stems largely 
from the fact that we have never set forth a standard for 
determining what qualifies as a sufficient interruption to 
restart the running of the required ten-year period under 
the Dedication Statute. We do so now by setting forth a 
bright-line Rule by which we intend to make application of 
the Dedication Statute more predictable: 
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to 
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and is 
reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an interruption 
sufficient to restart the running of the required ten-year 
period under the Dedication Statute. 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT10, H15 (emphasis added). This change in 
law precludes a finding of res judicata on the "highway-by-use" claim in Gillmor's 
Complaint. (R. 1-7). 
III. Sanctions should not have been awarded. 
Just because the Appellees' disagreed with Gillmor's position does not mean that 
Gillmor's counsel violated Rule 11 or that Appellees' are entitled to sanctions. All Rule 
11 requires is good faith and that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry into the validity 
of the action, which Gillmor's attorney did. (R. no , p. 2411. 3-9 and R. 229, p. 3211.12-
19). 
Because this action was not brought in contradiction of Rule 11 attorneys' fees 
should not have been awarded to the Appellees. 
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[B]y presenting a pleading ... an attorney... is certifying that 
to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, (b)(i) it is not being presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation; (b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. 
* * * 
A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be 
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such 
conduct ... [T]he sanction may consist of, or include, 
directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or if imposed on motion and warranted 
for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the 
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and 
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against 
a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ, P. (emphasis added). 
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Rule 11 has not been violated because this action was not frivolous. (R. 229, p. 35 
11.9-16). Before bringing this case, Gillmor's attorney did the research that Rule 11 
requires: "Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive research. The 
appropriate standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under all the 
circumstances". Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213, f8, quoting Barnard v. Sutliff, 
846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1992). "Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate where, as here, 
counsel's interpretation of existing law is reasonable and there is no evidence 
demonstrating counsel's failure to make a reasonable inquiry required by Rule 11". Id. 
at U26 (emphasis added). 
This case is not similar to Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) where the action was "no different from filing a new Complaint 
containing the original claims". Id. at 60, n. 1. Unlike in Schoney, Gillmor and her 
counsel, did not merely "file a new Complaint containing the original claims". Instead 
Gillmor's attorney researched the law and determined that Gillmor did have a basis to 
file this Complaint on these new theories (R. 229, p. 221. 23 - p. 231. 22), as explained 
above. 
"Thus, once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion after conducting 
appropriate research, the mere fact that the attorney's view of the law was wrong 
cannot support a finding of a Rule 11 violation". Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 
1236 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). Here Gillmor filed her Complaint to access her 
property and there have been changes in the law since the prior action. The District 
Court disagreed with Gillmor and found that her action was barred by res judicata. 
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However, even if res judicata barred a Complaint sanctions did not automatically 
follow. 
Another important Utah case on sanctions5, Mi Vida Enters, v. Steen-Adams, 
2005 UT App 400, also supports the position that sanctions are not appropriate when 
an action was brought in good faith. Id. at U16. 
To find that a party acted in 'bad faith/ the trial court must 
find that one or more of the following factors existed: (i) the 
party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party 
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in 
question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,316 (Utah 1998). 
None of the elements of bad faith exist in this case. Gillmor did not intend to take 
advantage of the Appellees'. Gillmor did not intend to hinder, delay or defraud the 
Appellees'. Gillmor and her attorney honestly believe this case is allowable for access to 
her property. (R. 229, p. 32,11.12-19). Because none of the requirements of bad faith 
exist the Court should not have awarded sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
5 This case is a Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 sanctions case but is applicable because as the 
District Court pointed out the bad faith test appears to be the same for Rule 11 sanctions. 
36 
Gillmor's action is not barred by res judicata. This is the first times these 
claims have been brought by Gillmor and the first time all landowners who block her 
access have been included in any legal action. Additionally, Rule 11 was not violated 
and sanctions should not have been awarded. The Court of Appeals should reverse 
both Orders below, and return the case to the District Court for further proceedings. 
DATED this day of January, 2009. 
Dallis A. Nordstrom 
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